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Fake/cloned/counterfeit products…
Finding horse meet in 
your beef lasagna?
Buying a fake branded
handbag for your loved one?




Counterfeiting accounts for 2% of the world trade!
Expected to exceed $1.7 trillion by 2015!
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Hardware integrity: …
 The corrupted, the counterfeit & the cloned IC
 Context
 Existing solutions
 PUFs used for IC authentication
 Detection of corrupted hardware by physical means
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The corrupted, the counterfeit & the cloned IC
 This is your original chip… running your critical, 
sensitive operation…
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The corrupted, the counterfeit & the cloned IC
 The corrupted chip is your original chip to which
some malicious hardware has been added for, say,
 Denial of service
 Outputting sensitive data
We also refer to such
malicious hardware as 
Trojan Horses
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The corrupted, the counterfeit & the cloned IC
 The counterfeit is an exact copy of your original chip…
doing the same operations…
 … sometimes from the same manufacturer
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The corrupted, the counterfeit & the cloned IC
 The ‘functional’ clone is another chip doing the same
critical & sensitive operations as your original chip…
 May be the same chip as your original one but with downgraded
features.
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Context… some examples
Fake & genuine Atmel chips
Genuine & Fake Toshiba transistors
Fake chips sold to US military in 2010
(VisionTech scandal)
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Context… another example
When a bank terminal or 
ATM machine is
presented with a car, 
how can it know that…
…it is a genuine card? 
…it is a functional clone? 
…it is a compromised card? 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2012/09/10/chip-
and-skim-cloning-emv-cards-with-the-pre-play-attack/
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Context… the supply chain



















































How far is everything under control? Who can you trust?
Some ‘accelerating’ factors:
 Delocalisation of production sites to foreign countries
 Increasing number of ‘design houses’
 More & more value-added chips
 More and more complexe systems
 ‘Throw old & buy new’ of modern electronic devices
Broker
© CEA. All rights reserved
Hardware integrity: from design to characterisation | J.Fournier & B. Robisson 13
Context… some figures
 Counterfeit products (in general) represent 10% of the goods
sold worldwide
 Costs around $200b in the US each year…
 …which represents 250K job losses!
 It was estimated that the cost of counterfeiting and piracy for 
G20 nations was between $450 and $650 billion in 2008 and
will grow to $1.2 to1.7 trillion in 2015
 For the semiconductor industry, the counterfeit market is
estimated at 7% of the whole market, representing approx. 
$10b of loss for the industry each year.
© CEA. All rights reserved
Hardware integrity: from design to characterisation | J.Fournier & B. Robisson 14
Context… a few stories
 In 2006 fake NEC company unveiled in China.
 Over 50 counterfeit products were produced there!
 In 2007, hacked payment terminals found in the UK. 
 Extra hardware had been inserted to store card data and PIN and send them to Pakistanis servers
 Between 2006 & 2010, VisionTech Components knowingly sold counterfeit ICs to approx. 1,101 
customers WW.
 including counterfeit ICs for military applications.
 In 2011, the Chinese company Huawei was excluded from the public safety broadband network projects. 
 Risk of hidden functions to disrupt or intercept (American) communications.
 In 2011, a virus infected the cockpits of America’s Predator and Reaper drones.
 logging pilots’ every keystroke during fly missions over Afghanistan and other warzones.
 A few on going initiatives:
 The Trusted Foundry Program: www.trustedfoundryprogram.org
 The Trust in IC program: started by the DARPA in 2007 to develop efficient methods for Hardware Trojan detection. 
 The ENISA (European Networks and Information Security Agency) initiated in 2011 an action towards securing the Supply Chains of 
electronics security devices.
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Context… the consequences
 Market loss… with the potential impact on the job 
market!
 Damaging brand image & customer satisfaction
 Downgraded security
 Dowgraded reliability
 Potential impact on the environment
 ‘Out-of-regulation’ production, disposal etc
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 Retrieving a digital « fingerprint » of a circuit (we’ll come back to that later)
 Obfuscation
 ‘Obfuscation’ of the HDL code
 Hardware ‘random’ Place & Route.
 Watermarking
 Similar to watermarking of a software, a picture, a movie…
 Objective is to add a « hidden » characteristic within the circuit
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Existing solutions (cont’d)
 ‘Cryptographic’ activation of the chip…
 … or restricting access to some parts of the chip
 Obfuscation of finite state machines
 Dynamique encryption of bit streams (for FPGAs)
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PUFs used for IC authentication
 Say we have 2 ‘identical’ circuits from the same
manufacturer…
 Those two circuits have subtle differences due to 
technological & fabrication processes
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PUFs used for IC authentication
 A ‘Physically Unclonable Function’ (PUF) is a function which
should allow to measure a characteristic « biometric data » of 
the circuit…
Those two have 




• Non predictable SRAM state upon power on
• Subtle differences in the frequency of two ring oscillators





• Stable wrt environmental conditions
•…tamper evident
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PUFs used for IC authentication
TWO APPROACHES
Design issues with (Silicon) PUF implementations
• Most existing research work rely on simulations or FPGA 
implementations.
• Very few existing ASIC implementations (UNIQUE project).
• But extremely difficult to do in industry (full custom design, 
careful layout etc).
Resistance of proposed PUFs to physical attacks
• Proposed PUFs satisfy the properties of uniqueness, stability 
& non reprocdubility in theory.
• Use physical attacks (power, EM, temperature, Vcc glitches) 
to corrupt those PUFs
We are working on the design of Arbiter PUFs and studying the 
compromise between the level at which design has to be done 
‘by hand’ and reaching the security properties of PUFs.
Use Vcc variations 
to make one PUF 
behave just like 
another one
Use power analysis 
to infer the value 
of the supposedly 




the output of the 
PUF 
© CEA. All rights reserved
Hardware integrity: from design to characterisation | J.Fournier & B. Robisson 23
Hardware integrity: …
 The corrupted, the counterfeit & the cloned IC
 Context
 Existing solutions
 PUFs used for IC authentication
 Detection of corrupted hardware by physical means
© CEA. All rights reserved
Hardware integrity: from design to characterisation | J.Fournier & B. Robisson 24
Detection of corrupted hw by physical means
 Our approach is to use side channel measurements to detect
the hardware Trojan or detect its effect… before it is too late
Objective is to use power consummed by the 
chip or the Electromagnetic emmations of 
the chip to detect the presence of the Trojan
Already an extensive literature on the subject, 
but most approaches detect the ‘effect’ of the 
Trojan, i.e. once your critical data has 
been leaked!!
We are developping a method based on Fault 
injections to detect modifications incurred by the 
presence of the Trojan on the circuit even if it is not 
active
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Detection of corrupted hw by physical
means
 Our approach is to use side channel measurements to detect
the hardware Trojan or detect its effect… before it is too late
Fault injections are usually used to corrupt sensitive operations to, say, 
retrieve cryptographic keys !
But we showed that fault injections can also be used to ‘characterize’ a 
circuit, for e.g. measure sensitive data delay paths (w. clock glitches)
“The good & the bad of physical functions”
We measure ‘faults generated’ for several values 
of clock glitches’ values & define caracteristic s. 
Difference between the distribution variation on genuine circuit
& that of the same circuit with a hardware Trojan
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To conclude…
Billions of euros at






Impact on the 
environment
It matters for…
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